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Compensation for Compulsory Acquisition of a Licensed Car Parking Space 
 
 
The Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (‘the Act’) deals with the acquisition of 
land by the State for public purposes and provides for compensation. 
 
The issue that arose for determination in Sorrento Medical Service Pty Ltd v 
Chief Executive, Dept of Main Roads [2007] QCA 73 was whether the appellant 
was entitled to claim compensation under the Act in respect of land resumed by 
the Main Roads Department over which the appellant had an exclusive 
contractual licence for car parking spaces for use in association with a medical 
centre leased by the appellant.  At first instance, it was held by the Land Court 
that the appellant was not entitled to compensation for the resumption of the car 
parking spaces.  The basis for this decision by the Land Court was that a right to 
compensation only exists where resumption has taken some proprietary interest 
of the claimant in the land.  Following an appeal to the Land Appeal Court being 
dismissed, the appellant instituted the present appeal to the Queensland Court of 
Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman J). 
 
To determine this dispute the Court of Appeal was required to determine whether 
the appellant’s contractual licence for the car parking spaces constituted a 
relevant ‘interest’ in the land for the purposes of s 12(5) of the Act. 
 
Section 12(5) of the Act provides: 
 
 On and from the date of the publication of the gazette resumption notice the land thereby 
taken shall be vested or become unallocated State land as provided by the foregoing 
provisions of this section absolutely freed and discharged from all trusts, obligations, 
mortgages, charges, rates, contracts, claims, estates, or interest of what kind soever, or if 
an easement only is taken, such easement shall be vested in the constructing authority 
or, where the gazette resumption notice prescribes, in the corporation requiring the 
easement, and the estate and interest of every person entitled to the whole or any part of 
the land shall thereby be converted into a right to claim compensation under this Act and 
every person whose estate and interest in the land is injuriously affected by the easement 
shall have a right to claim compensation under this Act.  (emphasis added) 
 
Separate judgments were delivered by the Court of Appeal with Holmes JA 
dissenting. 
 
Majority (McMurdo P and Chesterman J) 
 
The majority allowed the appeal and held that the appellant’s claim for 
compensation was to be remitted to the Land Court for determination.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority were of the view that the extended 
definition of ‘interest, in relation to land’, to be found in s 36 of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) was the applicable one for the purposes of 
interpreting the meaning of that term as it appears in s 12(5) of the Act.  Section 
36 relevantly provides: 
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 Interest, in relation to land … means: 
 
 i. a legal or equitable estate in the land … ; or 
 ii. a right, power or privilege over, or in relation to, the land …  
 
While the majority accepted that the appellant’s contractual right was not an 
interest in the land, nevertheless they took the view that the right must be 
construed as being a right, power or privilege over, or in relation to, the land.  In 
applying this extended definition of ‘interest’ the majority noted that the approach 
to the construction of provisions such as s 12(5) of the Act was explained by 
Gaudron J in Marshall v Director General, Department of Transport (2001) 205 
CLR 603 at 623: 
 
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that legislative provisions are to be construed 
according to their natural and ordinary meaning unless that would lead to a result that the 
legislature must be taken not to be intended.  The rule serves the important purpose of 
ensuring that those who are subject to the law understand the nature and extent of their 
rights and obligation … 
Although the rule that legislative provisions are to be construed according to their natural 
and ordinary meaning is the rule of general application, it is particularly important that it 
be given its full effect when, to do otherwise, would limit or impair individual rights, 
particularly property rights.  The right to compensation for injurious affection following 
upon the resumption of land is an important right of that kind and statutory provisions 
conferring such a right should be construed with all the generality that their words permit.  
Certainly, such provisions should not be construed on the basis that the right to 
compensation is subject to limitations or qualifications which are not found in the terms of 
the statute. 
 
As further support for their approach, the majority judgments make reference to s 
18 of the Act which sets out persons with a claim for compensation.  In particular, 
s 18(3) provides: 
 
 Compensation shall not be claimable by or payable to a person who is lessee, tenant or 
licensee of any land taken if the constructing authority upon written application allows the 
person’s estate or interest to continue uninterrupted. 
 
The majority considered that the clear implication to be drawn from s 18(3) was 
that a licensee of land has an estate or interest in land for the purposes of the 
Act. 
 
Holmes JA (dissenting) 
 
It is interesting to contrast the views expressed in the majority judgments with the 
dissenting judgment of Holmes JA.  Holmes JA opined that the words ‘entitled to 
the whole of any part of the land’ as they appear in s 12(5) of the Act suggested 
an interest at a proprietary level in the land, not merely an interest which has 
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some connection with the land.  For this reason, Holmes JA was not prepared to 
adopt the extended definition of interest provided by s 36 of the Acts 
Interpretations Act 1954 (Qld) for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of s 
12(5) of the Act.  For Holmes JA, it was critical that s 36 was providing a 
definition of an interest in relation to land while the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 
(Qld) was concerned with the narrower concept of an interest in land: 
 
 What the applicants had in the present case were personal rights.  Those rights 
constituted property, and they existed in relation to the land, but they were not proprietary 
rights in the land.  I agree with the conclusion of the Land Appeal Court that the applicant 
failed to establish a right of a proprietary nature and had no valid claim to compensation 




The difficulty of the statutory interpretation issues raised in this appeal is 
underscored by the following observation of McMurdo P 
 
 A reading of Chesterman J’s reasons on the one hand and those of Holmes JA, the Land 
Appeal Court and the President of the Land Court on the other, demonstrate both the 
opaqueness of the italicised words in s 12(5) and the persuasive but competing 
arguments for their construction.  (at [13]) 
 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the adoption by the majority of the extended 
definition of interest in relation to land provided by the Acts Interpretation Act 
1954 (Qld) clearly broadens those interests that will be capable of sustaining a 
claim for compensation under the Act.  However, it was expressly acknowledged 
by Chesterman J that this broader approach may prove problematic: 
 
 It may be that to apply the full width of the definition of “interest” found in the Acts 
Interpretation Act might, in some cases, produce claims for compensation that might 
properly attract the epithet “absurd”, but the present is not of that kind. One has here a 
right of property clearly identified, the limits of which are specified and which had a value. 
The proprietor is identified and the existence of the licence was proved in a document 
available for public search. In my opinion it is a matter of plain justice, not absurdity, that 
the proprietor should be compensated when his property is destroyed, for the good of the 
wider public.  (at [63]) 
 
As can be seen from this quotation, the commercial value attached to the 
contractual licence in question seems to have been a relevant factor in the 
judgment of Chesterman J.  A similar approach may be discerned in the 
judgment of McMurdo P (at [14]).  Although this approach may accord with 
principles for the interpretation of statutes dealing with statutory compensation, 
the decision is not without difficulty for practitioners.  Although signaling a 
broadening of interests capable of sustaining a claim for compensation, what will 
constitute a sufficiently valuable interest to justify a compensable claim will fall to 
be determined on a case by case basis. 
 
BD 
